Week In Review: Flashy Headlines, Peace Efforts, And More...

Orda has put together a brief synopsis of last week's news.

Trump's Peace Initiative, Munich Conference

Donald Trump revealed details of separate phone conversations with Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelenskyy regarding potential peace negotiations for Ukraine. 

On the same day as Trump's calls, EU foreign ministers met in Paris and issued a statement pledging increased support for Ukraine. The meeting, which included ministers from France, Germany, Poland, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom, and Ukraine, along with EU foreign policy and defense chiefs, emphasized their commitment to Ukraine's independence and sovereignty.

The Ministers stressed that Ukraine and Europe must be part of any negotiations and that Ukraine should receive strong security guarantees, a statement reiterated by Zelenskyy. 

However, as the February 14-15 Munich Security Conference revealed, there is little convergence and clarity amid concerns over transatlantic unity, Ukraine's security arrangements, and the broader implications of shifting US-Russia relations under the Trump administration.

Kellogg's "exclusion" of  Europe from future peace talks, along with discussions about deploying European peacekeepers in Ukraine, underscores the growing rift between U.S. and European approaches.

As US officials dismiss Ukraine's NATO aspirations and aim to return occupied territory, Europe must emerge as the counterbalance Kyiv is seeking. Still, Europe has internal actors that seem to be continuing to pursue Russia's reintegration. 

Indeed, Hungary and Slovakia have proven problematic when it comes to matters concerning Ukraine. And with Germany's snap elections looming, the divide could widen.

At the same time, Zelenskyy's refusal to sign the proposed mineral deal demonstrates his strategic attempt to maximize Ukraine's economic leverage. Yet, the maneuvering space may shrink as U.S. military aid could become more conditional.

U.S. and Russian officials' move to re-establish their dialogue, coupled with a potential sanction removal deal for Belarus President Lukashenko, a close Kremlin ally, puts the White House's priorities into question. Trump could very well be seeking quick political optics. 

Although Belarus's opposition praised Trump's efforts, it is unclear whether this is a serious policy shift or just a trial-and-error effort that could embolden Lukashenko, known for balancing between Russia and the West.

The unclear situation has also caused China to regauge its strategy regarding Ukraine.

Beijing could be balancing political and economic interests on both sides or positioning itself as a broker for leverage.

Russia's Regional Influence in Question?

A Russian government presentation obtained by The Financial Times reveals Moscow's concerns about Western influence in Central Asia.

The document, presented at an April 2024 strategic session led by Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, reportedly acknowledges that Western sanctions have effectively distanced Russia from its traditional trading partners.

In this context, there has been increased diplomatic activity, as evidenced by the meeting between the Security Council Secretaries of Russia and Kazakhstan in Astana, perhaps substantiating the document.

Regardless, relations continue with Central Asian nations wielding more authority. Such a dynamic can be seen in the recent diplomatic "exchange" between Russia's Prime Minister and Kyrgyz authorities.

They will also continue to pursue increasing ties with one another and beyond.

Interactions between Türkiye, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan, along with constructing the long-awaited China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, confirm this versatility.

Russia will maintain its presence even if the above concerns are grounded, considering its increasing economic ventures in the region and a recent military document signed with Uzbekistan.

To what extent Moscow will remain isolated, given the unpredictable nature of the Trump administration, is also crucial, as restrictions have thus far confined Moscow.

But the constraints have demonstrated limitations.

Despite initial sanction concerns, Sudan agreed to host a Russian naval base at Port Sudan. 

The 25-year deal includes provisions for military equipment transport and defense system installation. Moreover, an investigation points to Western companies continuing to do business with sanctioned entities, suggesting Russia maintains some maneuverability.

The Kremlin may have also made progress with Syria's current leadership.

Following a call between Putin and Ahmed al-Sharaa, Russia sent Syria more than $23 million in Syrian Pounds printed before the interim leaders came into power.

Russia's Central Bank did not clarify the amount sent, though.

Meanwhile, experts suggest the dollars and euros transferred to Russia by former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad are unlikely to be returned along with Assad himself.

The reported extradition demand could be a bargaining tool for other concessions.

Russian involvement could still complicate Syrian efforts to obtain Western sanction relief. Clashes with Lebanon-based Hezbollah fighters and smugglers on its border compound the situation.

Damascus will, therefore, pragmatically prioritize what it sees as beneficial, i.e., reconstruction, investments, security, and state-building. To what extent Moscow can facilitate such tasks ultimately hinges on its ability to deliver concrete benefits despite constraints amid growing regional autonomy. 

And thus far, the delivery has been limited.

Russia-Azerbaijan Tensions, Other South Caucasus Developments

Following the closing of Baku's Russian House, Azerbaijan declared State Duma deputy Nikolai Valuev a persona non-grata

The ban follows what Azerbaijani officials described as "threatening and offensive statements" regarding the closure. This development coincides with Azerbaijan's order to reduce Sputnik staff from 40 to one employee.

In another challenge to regional influence, Armenia's move toward EU integration has prompted a response from the Kremlin.

Yet, Russian officials maintained relatively cool heads, acknowledging Armenia's sovereign right to pursue EU ties. Discussions also continue about maintaining dual membership in the EU and EAEU. 

Perhaps Russian officials perceive this outcome as a transactional benefit, though Armenia's EU membership could be a long path.

Against this backdrop, divergences persist.

The trilateral working group between Armenia, Russia, and Azerbaijan on transport and economic communications has "been suspended," according to Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin.

The work of the trilateral group, led by deputy prime Ministers of Russia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia on unblocking transport communications and resuming economic ties, is now interrupted and frozen, if you will, Galuzin stated.

Although Moscow has urged all parties to return to the working group format, their calls look unconvincing, considering the above developments. 

Azerbaijan is likely to persist in advocating for the Zangezur Corridor, while Armenia pushes for its alternative, the Crossroads of Peace. 

Prospects for a resolution between Baku and Yerevan appear bleak, especially considering Armenian PM Pashinyan's recent article where he writes: 

There are two possible origins for these propaganda statements - either Azerbaijan genuinely believes that Armenia intends to attack it, or Azerbaijan itself intends to attack and is trying to create justification for this. In both cases, the fundamental point is Azerbaijan's assertion about Armenia's intention to attack Azerbaijan.

Pashinyan also emphasized that sufficient groundwork has been laid for a peace treaty, though Armenia still awaits Azerbaijan's response to several proposals, suggesting Baku is unwilling to cooperate.

In this context, Armenia and Cyprus Defense Ministers' meeting on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference is particularly notable: Türkiye backs Azerbaijan with ongoing tensions with Cyprus, and normalization between Ankara and Yerevan looks to have demonstrated limitations.

Big Uzbekistan Court Case

The Uzbek Supreme Court has sentenced 10 individuals in connection with an assassination attempt on Komil Allamjonov, former deputy head of the presidential administration and ally of President Mirziyoyev's daughter Saida.

Three defendants - Shukhrat Rasulov, Shohruh Ahmedov, and Ismail Jahongirov - received 23-year prison terms. Business figure Javlon Yunusov, arrested in South Korea, received 18.5 years, while former Tashkent police deputy chief Doniyor Tashkhodjaev was sentenced to seven years.

The attack occurred on October 26, 2024, just before the parliamentary elections, when a spray of shots targeted Allamjonov's SUV. Both he and his driver survived. 

The event triggered high-level dismissals.

Sources from Radio Ozodlik suggest Rasulov organized the attempt, claiming he and Yunusov are associates of the President's son-in-law, Otabek Umarov, deputy head of the Presidential Security Service.

Energy Developments

China's new tariffs on U.S. energy imports have prompted engagement with Kazakhstan. A Chinese delegation representing over 30 companies visited Kazakhstan shortly after Beijing announced 15% tariffs on U.S. coal and LNG and 10% on crude oil and agricultural equipment.

Bilateral trade between China and Kazakhstan reached $43.8 billion in 2024, showing a 6.8% year-on-year increase.

QazaqGaz and PetroChina International later inked an agreement to increase Kazakhstan's natural gas supplies to China. While specific volumes weren't disclosed, QazaqGaz plans a new pipeline branch to China, with construction expected to take two to three years.

Kazakhstan could also emerge as a transit route for Russian gas exports to China, with growing domestic demand and China surpassing Europe in Russian gas purchases.

Incidentally, after ending gas transit to Russia last year, Turkmenistan scored a long-sought deal with Türkiye.

They formalized a gas supply agreement between BOTAŞ and Türkmengaz, with gas flow scheduled to begin March 1, 2025. The agreement, involving approximately 2 billion cubic meters in swap arrangements, will utilize Iran's existing natural gas network.

Still, experts warn that Ashgabat, already heavily reliant on China for gas exports, risks developing a similar dependency on Iran.

Considering Turkmenistan's unfavorable position, Ankara likely achieved desirable conditions. Only time will tell what will come of it.