Week In Review: Power Plays, Fractured Fronts, And More...

Orda has put together a brief synopsis of last week's news.

Diplomatic Channels Fray

U.S. officials continued their attempts to put an end to the war in Ukraine, with U.S. special envoy Steven Witkoff meeting with Putin on 12 April. Witkoff reportedly informed the White House that the quickest path to ending hostilities would involve recognizing Russian sovereignty over the Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions, a long-standing goal for Russia since its initial failures in the war.

Meanwhile, Trump extended Executive Order 14024 — originally issued under Joe Biden — for another year, maintaining sanctions on Russia for activities including cyberattacks, election interference, and transnational corruption. The order continues to freeze Russian assets and imposes secondary restrictions on foreign institutions tied to Russia’s defense sector.

Earlier reports that the Trump administration was exploring ways to ease certain sanctions, along with Trump's claims to ratchet up sanction pressure, stand in contrast to this development. 

Still, the extension could be nothing more than political optics to usurp credit against the backdrop of little tangible progress.

Speaking in Paris on April 18, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio declared that the United States would cease its attempts to mediate a peace agreement between Ukraine and Russia unless a clear signal emerges that a deal is within reach. Rubio emphasized that while President Donald Trump remains "interested" in ending the war, the administration is also focused on “other priorities.” One of them is likely negotiations with Iran.

The Kremlin could influence talks between Washington and Tehran, but Moscow is unlikely to overstep boundaries, considering Iran is one of its remaining allies.

Rubio's announcement came just one day after Russia’s U.N. Ambassador Vasily Nebenzya cast doubt on any near-term resolution. During an April 17 briefing, Nebenzya flatly declared that a full ceasefire in Ukraine was “unrealistic." In that context, ongoing strikes following Witkoff's meeting with Putin are also noteworthy.

Regardless of the extension of the above order, U.S. officials subsequently signaled that easing sanctions, along with the alleged recognition of Crimea as Russian territory, could be on the table to achieve a peace agreement.

The European Union would have to participate in any easing of sanctions, but the continent has thus far demonstrated little interest in doing so. 

Ukraine, for its part, has also made tentative moves to placate the current U.S. administration, for example, by signing a memorandum of understanding on rare earth metal deals. However, little is known about its contents; it is purportedly unrelated to the peace talks, and the conditions have long been in flux. 

Meanwhile, President Zelenskyy on April 17 accused China of directly supporting Russia’s war effort. This marked Kyiv’s first official claim of Chinese weapons aiding Moscow. Previously, Beijing had denied such involvement and pledged not to arm Russia.

Although the announcement is a significant escalation with potential consequences for China’s international posture, Kyiv may be trying to catch the attention of U.S. politicians, given the increasingly anti-Chinese sentiment among hawkish lawmakers. 

Ultimately, the wishy-washy behavior of Trump's administration has taken its toll, as they deflect responsibility elsewhere.

In parallel, both Ukraine and Russia claimed readiness for an Easter ceasefire, yet Moscow had made a similar announcement in 2023 for Orthodox Christmas while military operations continued. Putin may be attempting to demonstrate "willingness" to show Kyiv as "uncooperative."

Zelenskyy, on the other hand, announced violations of an Easter ceasefire that never was.

Russia appears emboldened, as it sees even a consideration of yielding the above regions as legitimization. Current restrictions have also done little to deter Moscow, and future ones could take a toll.

Nonetheless, Washington seems unlikely to take decisive action while momentum continues to peter out and Ukraine's security guarantees remain largely unanswered.

Tajikistan's Border Concerns

CSTO Secretary General Imangali Tasmagambetov met with Tajik President Emomali Rahmon to discuss the first stage of a multi-year program aimed at strengthening regional border security, namely along the Tajik-Afghan section, with weapons deliveries and infrastructure improvements scheduled through 2029.

Against that backdrop, the Russian Supreme Court suspended the ban on the Taliban on April 17, formerly designated as a terrorist group. This legal shift paves the way for formal ties between Moscow and Kabul, with trade, energy, and infrastructure cooperation high on the agenda. 

 Central Asia has already taken such steps, as the region seeks to enhance regional cohesion and security.

Tajikistan, on the other hand, is known for its suspicion of the group, and fears of other radicalized groups in Afghanistan still loom. Joint drills with Russian forces, coupled with ongoing CSTO involvement, have demonstrated the country's readiness to support Dushanbe; however, it still looks to other directions, namely Iran. 

At its core, lifting the ban in Russia does not guarantee complete collaboration, as evidenced by the diplomatic language used in the explanation of the decision. The nature of the removal, i.e., a suspension, suggests the potential for reinstating the ban, a noteworthy aspect since it may leave room for policy reversals.

Additionally, Russia remains bound by U.N. Security Council sanctions imposed on the Taliban in 1999, including asset freezes and travel bans, which could continue to influence Russia's interactions with the group.

Russia and Tajikistan, therefore, remain skeptical, yet conscious of the need to engage in interaction they perceive as a calculated necessity.

Kyrgyzstan: Legal Reckonings

The country’s Constitutional Court ruled that the criminal case against exiled former President Kurmanbek Bakiyev could be reviewed if he returns.

While Kyrgyz officials insist the court is acting independently, speculation has grown about a potential effort to rehabilitate Bakiyev, who fled to Belarus after a deadly 2010 uprising. Separately, another former president, Almazbek Atambayev, faces a verdict in connection with the 2019 Koi-Tash unrest.

Prosecutors are seeking an 11-year sentence, while Atambayev maintains the charges are politically motivated.

The differentiation between the two cases could mean that Atambayev is still perceived as a politically potent figure. Bakiyev, even upon returning, would be unlikely to regain support, considering the nature of his ousting, whereas Atambayev may be seen as a target of his successor. 

The current authorities, having once again "thwarted" a coup plot, are anything but eager to allow such a political heavyweight to regain traction.

Energy Troubles

China’s ambassador to Russia publicly dismissed the feasibility of supplying Russian gas to China via Kazakhstan, citing pipeline constraints. He referenced a long-sought project of Moscow, Power of Siberia 2, as the most logical alternative. 

Advancing the pipeline appears to have made little progress. Beijing also maintains negotiating leverage over the pipeline’s future.

China, meanwhile, has halted importing U.S. LNG, possibly strengthening Moscow's position in its markets, but has long been reluctant to be overly reliant on a single supplier.

Still, China is set to increase its imports of Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG). At the same time, Europe opted out of sanctioning them, despite pledges to phase out Russian energy imports by 2027.

The Power of Siberia 2 as an additional eastward pipeline in the capacity Moscow seeks remains uncertain.

Regardless, it will continue to reap profits, albeit at a notably lower rate, from LNG sales, especially given the EU's lack of confidence in the U.S. as a reliable partner. 

Amidst Washington's trade war, LNG could indeed become a geopolitical instrument.

It's becoming increasingly difficult to regard U.S. LNG as a neutral commodity: at a certain point it might become a geopolitical tool, Tatiana Mitrova, a research fellow at Columbia University's Centre on Global Energy Policy told Reuters.