Week In Review: Arrests, Sentences, Appointments, and More...

Orda.kz has put together a brief synopsis of last week's news. This week's edition focuses on the "Basayev Brigade" and Saida Mirziyoyeva's latest appointment in Uzbekistan.

Sentences and Arrests In A War Long Over

On June 25, the Southern District Military Court in Rostov-on-Don handed down two heavy sentences.

Takhir Begeldiev, a Stavropol native, and Vakhit Khamzathanov, from Chechnya, were sentenced to 24 and 21 years, respectively.

The sentence was rendered for their alleged roles in a 1999 attack on Russian servicemen in the Chechen village of Chervlyonnaya. Prosecutors argued they had been part of an assault orchestrated by Shamil Basayev and Amir Ibn al-Khattab — one that left 15 soldiers dead and 28 wounded.

Shamil Basayev was a leading figure in the Chechen separatist movement, known for orchestrating high-profile attacks during the Chechen wars. Amir Ibn al-Khattab was a foreign Islamist fighter who became his close ally and military commander. Al-Khattab is believed to have come from either Jordan or Saudi Arabia

The two led the 1999 incursion into Dagestan, one of the events that triggered the Second Chechen War.

The case marks just the latest entry in prosecutions tied to the militant raids of the late 1990s and early 2000s.

They are only now being adjudicated. Begeldiev, notably, was already serving a 14-year sentence handed down in March 2021 for participating in the 1999 incursion into Dagestan.

Just weeks earlier, on May 30, the FSB announced the arrest of four other men: Batyr Arsanov, Arsen Koldasov, Radzhab Khasaev, and Rasul Takhtamirov, accused of taking part in a series of engagements, including the well-known Ulus-Kert battle of 2000, which cost the lives of 80 Pskov paratroopers.

Investigators claim the men were also involved in the Basaev-Khattab incursion into Dagestan and firefights in the Chechen lowlands. 

Another arrest occurred in 2023 — Ibragim Magomedov, a native of Dagestan, was detained. Magomedov allegedly took part in a 1999 firefight in Novolaksky District, where two officers were killed and 18 wounded. His case, like others, will be heard in the same military court in Rostov. 

Along with the long dormancy, human rights defenders argue that the “evidence” in such cases often hinges on anonymous witnesses giving logically flawed testimonies.

Similar cases stemming from the mention of Basayev have also emerged.

On April 23, a man from Astrakhan — later identified as Denis Polyakov — was fined 500,000 rubles for social media posts in which he praised Basayev and justified the 2004 Beslan school siege.

The incident took place from September 1–3, 2004, when armed militants took over 1,100 hostages, mostly children, at a school in Beslan, North Ossetia. The militants were linked to Shamil Basayev and demanded Russian troop withdrawal from Chechnya. 

Basayev had staged a similar scenario during the First Chechen War.

He led a group of around 150 armed militants across the Chechen border into southern Russia and seized control of City Hospital No. 1 in Budennovsk, a town in Stavropol Krai. They put forward demands to initiate a ceasefire and peace talks.

After a botched assault by Russian security forces that led to dozens of casualties, then–Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin agreed to the terms to release the hostages, allowing the men safe passage back to Chechnya.

The Beslan hostage situation, meanwhile, ended with Russian forces storming the building, resulting in 334 people being killed, including 186 children. It remains one of Russia’s deadliest terrorist attacks and sparked lasting controversy over the government’s response and use of force.

Though the charges against Polyakov — promoting terrorism and extremism — carried potential prison time, the court ultimately opted for a monetary penalty and a three-year ban on website administration.

A similar case surfaced when a dual citizen of Russia and Abkhazia was detained in Sochi after posting what authorities described as “glorified depictions” of Basayev. The man now faces up to seven years in prison under anti-terror propaganda laws.

Incidentally, on January 20, Ramzan Belyalov, convicted in 2017 for his alleged role in the 1995 Budyonnovsk hospital siege, filed an appeal with Russia’s Supreme Court. His defense cited multiple witnesses attesting to his presence in Bashkortostan, far from the site of the attack. The original sentence — 15 years — remains in force pending review.

In October 2024, charges were brought against Ilyas Yakubov, an MMA fighter from Chechnya. Yakubov, arrested in 2023 for a video referencing Basayev, was freed after enlisting to fight in Ukraine. The justifying terrorism charges were reclassified to allow his deployment.

Another notable sentence followed in September 2024. Magomed Alkhanov was sentenced to 10 years for his alleged participation in the Ulus-Kert battle. Alkhanov’s defense argued that he was underage at the time, bore no signs of injury, and was identified only by a single sniper’s testimony, 20 years after the event.

Reportedly, over 30 people have been sentenced in connection with the Ulus-Kert battle alone, utilizing evidence including secret witnesses.

Human rights defenders argue that some cases have already exceeded the plausible number of combatants who could have participated, and security forces and law enforcement could be manipulating these instances to advance their careers. At the same time, there is reason to believe that such efforts aim to maintain heroism.

Regarding the Pskov paratroopers, certain independent accounts have suggested tactical missteps and command failures may have led to the unit’s isolation. President Vladimir Putin reportedly visited the Pskov Division and apologized to the relatives of the fallen soldiers for the "gross miscalculations made" that Russian soldiers have to pay for with their lives.

It never came to light who committed said "miscalculations," and only reports claim Putin made such remarks.

Big Appointments In Tashkent

On June 23, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev signed a decree reviving the prominent role of Head of the Presidential Administration, a position eliminated in 2023 as part of a bureaucratic streamlining.

His daughter, Saida Mirziyoyeva, received the post.

Mirziyoyeva has already held influential roles in overseeing communications and media policy and is perceived as a reformist. The latest appointment could have been a move to solidify her already influential status even further, consolidate familial control, and project a modern image for the current administration.

The new position also positions her at the very heart of the policy-making and communications apparatus.

That same evening, Komil Allamjonov was named her independent advisor. Allamjonov, who survived an assassination attempt in October 2024, once held an influential position close to the President.

He has now returned amid the reshuffle, perhaps another factor in the decision to revive the post; Mirziyoyeva had already been a presidential aide.

Otabek Umarov, former deputy head of the President's State Security Service, was once seen as another potential successor, but was sacked amid broader dismissals following the attempt on Allamjonov's life. There is no evidence linking him to it.

However, RFE/RL Ozodlik, citing unnamed sources, reported there was a clandestine network known as “The Office,” purportedly formed by Umarov, and a conflict between Komil Allamjonov, Umarov, and the State Security Service. There is no concrete evidence confirming the network's existence, and it has more than likely been dismantled.

Umarov has not disappeared entirely, however, making public appearances after his departure and Saida's appointment. Whatever political ambitions he may have had appear effectively curtailed.

Meanwhile, a consistent argument is that Saida is being groomed to replace her father. Shavkat Mirizoyev should remain in office until at least 2030, and Uzbekistan's patriarchal society could prove to be a roadblock.

Regardless, on May 28-29, meetings in Moscow with prominent political figures underscore Saida Mirziyoyeva's significance in domestic and foreign policies. 

Whether she eventually succeeds her father — by design or default — remains secondary for now. And if her reformist ideals are genuine, pushback from entrenched elites benefiting from the current status quo will become more noticeable.

Should the resistance become overbearing, moves to support her father's position, who could retain power until 2037, may move to the forefront.