Week in Review: Regional Tensions, Border Fire Claims, and More...

Orda has put together a brief synopsis of last week's news.

Diplomatic Tensions Rise between Armenia and Azerbaijan Amid Ongoing Georgian Political Crisis

Claims of border fire made by Azerbaijani authorities prompted responses from Armenian officials twice in the beginning of this week. 

The exchange of accusations and denials follows a long-standing trend between the two nations.

Before the above claims, Azerbaijan's President Ilham Aliyev asserted that Armenia's leadership had established a "fascist ideology" that must be eliminated in an interview on January 7.

Armenian officials, in turn, stated they would not stoop to Baku's level and reiterated efforts to establish and maintain peace.

Baku may be testing the waters to see how far its aggressive narratives can push boundaries and whether or not it can go further.

Georgia, meanwhile, continues to experience a political crisis as oppositionists press on in their efforts to hold new parliamentary elections. Against this backdrop, US lawmakers have proposed a bill to classify the Georgian Dream Party's victory and government as illegitimate. 

International intervention has done little to dissuade Georgia's current government; grassroots movements must continue to spearhead efforts to change the country's current course, but external pressure can amplify them.

Tajikistan Court Cases

Two high-profile court cases in Tajikistan took unfortunate  yet predictable turns

A Tajik court has sentenced Akhmad Ibrohim, editor-in-chief of "Paik" newspaper, to 10 years in prison on contested charges of bribery, extortion, and extremism.

Ibrohim denies all charges, while his supporters believe they are retaliation for his journalism.

In a separate case, prosecutors have demanded lengthy sentences for alleged coup plotters, including 30-year terms for former parliament member Saidjafar Usmonzoda and ex-Foreign Minister Hamrokhon Zarifi.

The closed-door trials, which began after a series of arrests in June 2024, involve multiple high-ranking political figures charged with treason and attempting to seize power.

The Paik editor's trial may reflect the second's outcome, especially if assumptions about ensuring "a smooth power transition" hold true.

No More Mr. Nice Guy

Prior to reports of a second presidential bid,  Zelenskyy asserted that Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko called and apologized for the attacks on Ukraine from Belarus.

Lukashenko's press secretary quickly dismissed the claims, which the Belarus President followed with his classically vague analogies.

Lukashenko's comments may be deflection, aimed at bolstering his appeal to domestic and foreign audiences. He likely does not want to appear weak or overly aggressive in his responses, but recent crackdowns point to the contrary.

At the same time, former Ukrainian President Poroshenko and other Ukrainian politicians are pushing for a total Russian oil and gas transit ban. Given the US's latest sanctions targeting Russia's energy-generated revenue, its necessity remains questionable.

Their aim could be to undermine Zelenskyy, who had defeated Poroshenko in Ukraine's 2019 presidential elections. This holds water considering the former President's previous announcement to run for office once the war ends.

Kyiv is also already navigating strained relations with Slovakia and Hungary following the discontinuation of Russian gas transit via Ukraine, which, coupled with the West's shifting narratives, could compound the effect.

Regardless, Poroshenko's unpopularity has likely gone nowhere, and the logical heavyweight opponent would be Ukraine's former commander-in-chief, Valery Zaluzhnyi, who could very well secure victory. Hypothesis aside, elections can only come after the war ends.

And Kyiv's current primary goals are more directed toward security guarantees and EU membership.

Within this context, Trump's claims of quickly ending Russia's war of aggression seem to be fading away as he continues to make more and more claims with little backing.

Even if he and Putin meet, there's no certainty it will not be another rigmarole without Ukrainian participation.

Sanction "Whack-a-mole"

Russia also seems to be in a predicament with sanctions.

Although the latest restrictions are eye-catching, Rosneft, the leading supplier of China and India, nations that have been scooping up Russian oil since the beginning of the war, has been left untouched. 

Expert opinion suggests that the restrictions are "smart sanctions," allowing other oil exporters, i.g. Saudia Arabia and UAE, to compensate for the gap formed. 

What is more, the sanctions do not stop third parties from purchasing and reselling oil from companies that have fallen under the restrictions.

Such entities could be found and black-listed but this does not prevent their replacements, creating a hide-and-go-seek scenario. 

As reported by Novaya Gazeta, the shadow fleet falling under restrictions could impact Indian imports, but the effect could end there.

Non-sanctioned companies will likely switch positions with traditional exporters, while workarounds may surface and outpace restrictions.

Recent reports of alleged shadow fleet tankers idling off the coast of China indicate trouble, but China imports the bulk of the oil via pipeline.

OPEC+ production quotas and Russia's pledge to compensate for overproduction will also be factors.

Immediate collapse is slim to none, but production is set to drop one way or another.

On a different front, Moscow seems to be experiencing issues regarding its military presence in Syria.

Syria's new authorities are not keen on allowing Russia to evacuate its military assets.

This follows previous reports by Ukrainian intelligence that Russia is seeking to do so and points to talks between Damascus and Moscow being strained and the former having the leverage. 

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