A Full House.

The VI Summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) took off on 13 October. A whole swathe of presidents and political figures arrived to take part.

11 presidents arrived from Azerbaijan, Iraq, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Palestine, Tajikistan, Russia, Türkiye, Uzbekistan, Qatar, as well as the Vice President of Vietnam, the Vice President of China and five ministers. The President of Belarus, an observer of CICA, also arrived in the capital.

This event was not the only one on the agenda. Astana hosted three summits: VI CICA, the CIS Summit and the Central Asia-Russia Summit. To the untrained eye, the event seemed to be nothing more than a typical gathering of eastern politicians. Astana, however, is making clear power moves. 

Aside from claiming that the era of Asia has come upon us, the Kazakh president, Qasym-Jomart Toqayev, is nimbly making his country the centrepiece in multi-faceted development amongst Asian nations. Indeed, his offer to transform the CICA into a permanent platform was met with approval from all present states. This opportunity can present Kazakhstan with the ability to become a major regional player, though this requires a general consensus between participants so that the organization can function properly.   

Full Steam Ahead

At the summit, Toqayev emphasized the importance of developing a functioning transit corridor for the prosperity of the nations present at CICA. This falls in line with Toqayev’s own plans for increasing Kazakhstan's transit potential. Toqayev's recent instruction to lay a railway line to China through Bakhty, Kazakhstan during his meeting with the Abai oblast’s public also confirms this intention. 

Other regional actors such as Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are also likely interested in the development of their own logistical prospects. Uzbek president, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, stated how important it is to create a dialogue with “the internationally forgotten” Afghanistan. Turkmenistan’s president, Serdar Berdimuhamedow, said much of the same the following day at the “Russia - Central Asia” meeting.

Afghanistan could be an important link in both Ashgabat’s and Tashkent's logistics. (See also) Instability in Afghanistan may continue to hamper any efforts made for integration, but a jump in statistics demonstrates Kabul’s potential. The current situation in Afghanistan also presents itself as a threat to Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, as the two nations share a border with the Afghan nation, thus further explaining the efforts made by the leaders of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. 

Türkiye also reiterated the importance of finding new transport corridors via the "modern silk road", i.e. the middle corridor. This is an interest it shares with Kazakhstan. Ankara considers their territory as the “backbone” of this route. However, bottlenecks in the route could make it a troublesome venture. 

Armenia and Azerbaijan’s conflict will hinder the Zangezur corridor’s use in this route, thus potentially removing it from the equation. The situation around the Lachin Corridor and its alternative route continue to be a point of contention between Yerevan and Baku. (See also) Azerbaijan expects the same unimpeded access via Zangezur to its exclave of Nakhchivan as Yerevan does with ethnic Armenians in Karabakh.

Armenia, however, sees their inroads into Karabakh as humanitarian and does not consider the Zangezur corridor as such. Semantics also play their role here, as Armenia is against the term "corridor". Yerevan also fears not having control over the corridor itself and losing its connection to Iran. Iran has not kept quiet over the matter as well. (See also) Russia is also likely interested in remaining a key security guarantor in the situation. This role will allow it to maintain Moscow's influence in the area. Moscow may also gain new economic outlets via whatever transit is agreed upon.

The links in Batumi and Poti, Georgia will remain untouched in this regard. Yet Georgian Black Sea connectivity for transporting shipments to and from the Caspian Sea at the Eastern end of the Caucasus remains an issue. The Asian Development Bank’s allocation of funds may resolve it. Reportedly, this cash injection will lead to the Georgian network’s annual freight capacity potentially increasing to 48 million tons by 2024.

The route will face additional issues in harmonizing customs, underdeveloped infrastructure, data management, and the looming global recession. (See also) The supposed growth in corruption cases connected to road construction in Kazakhstan is also not encouraging.

Despite the middle corridor’s smaller capacity and higher cost, the logistical opportunities are there. States involved are moving towards optimizing their transit potential. The route needs time for further development. Although it will unlikely be a replacement for the alternative and now less desirable Northern Corridor through Russia, it is logical to move forward with it.

My Turn

Türkiye’s president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan seized the opportunity to highlight Ankara’s efforts in mediating the war in Ukraine and the “need” to restructure the current global security structure. This is an obvious reference to Ankara’s “The World Is Bigger than Five” discourse. That is, what Ankara considers as the disregarding of the majority of the world population in the current global system.

Russian President, Vladimir Putin, was amongst those who supported Toqayev’s initiative on turning the CICA into a legitimate international organization. But he did not shy away from his typical anti-western blame game. Putin even went as far as to call the US occupants of Afghanistan and demanded the Afghan people be compensated along with their assets being unfrozen. 

The Russian president also reiterated the need to implement trading in national currencies between CICA nation members. Iranian President, Ebrahim Raisi, made a similar statement regarding the use of regional currencies. Both nations are ostensibly trying to mitigate the sanctions against them by pushing this rhetoric. 

Alternatives

Putin reportedly mentioned to Erdoğan the ability to turn Türkiye into a “gas hub for exports to Europe”. The Russian president also stated that Russia would consider the potential construction of a new gas line in Türkiye if there were to be a mutual interest. The Turkish side, however, chose to turn the discussion in the direction of atomic energy and grain. 

Erdoğan’s initial avoidance of the gas topic is well warranted considering the hindering effect stemming from sanctions against Russia. The Turkish president’s mentioning of grain may be a subtle response to Moscow’s blatant threats of undermining the grain deal Ankara jointly mediated with the UN. Erdoğan would also later reveal that the two presidents discussed transferring fertilizers to underdeveloped or undeveloped countries. This is another possible attempt made by Ankara to boost their image.

The Turkish president’s subsequent announcements on 15 and 19 October about “studying” and then accepting Putin’s proposal on making Türkiye a gas hub should come as no surprise. Ankara’s aspiration of becoming such a hub is nothing new. Ankara could then potentially alleviate the energy crisis for Europe. In turn, Erdoğan would snatch up yet another international policy win. Albeit everything is dependent on how Europe chooses to react. 

Europe’s interest in such gas exports is unlikely considering Russia’s consistent weaponized use of energy. This does not necessarily eliminate the gas hub prospect. Türkiye could use Russian gas to satisfy its own growing domestic demand while re-exporting other incoming gas. The potential to bargain for cheaper Russian gas or postpone their payments altogether could also help reduce record-level inflation in Türkiye.

Lot Goin’ On

Most of the Common Wealth of Independent States (CIS) nations’ leaders made dry and predictable statements. Information on Serdar Berdimukhamedow’s speeches is limited to his official presidential page saying “he took part” in CIS and Russia And Central Asia meetings. Toqayev used the CIS platform to explain his “initiative" for supporting the Russian language in the CIS. 

Toqayev’s Uzbek counterpart used the platform to announce the need to remove trade barriers between CIS states. The Tajik president hinted at this as well, while calling for more effective work between CIS members. Belarus’ President Lukashenko made his traditionally out-of-place comments. This time they were about CIS nations being put to “the test” by western nations. 

Putin, however, utilized the CIS summit to insist on the importance of "peaceful solutions" for conflicts on the territories of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Ironically enough, Ukraine used to be a CIS member. 

Four current CIS members, i.e. Armenia and Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, have engaged in armed conflict with one another in the past months and years.  Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov and Tajik President Emomali Rahmon held a closed discussion on the recent border conflict between their nations with Putin the day before. 

Long-lasting tensions between Bishkek and Dushanbe have done anything but subside. Yet another border conflict between them broke out this past September. In a press conference after the CIS summit on 14 October, Putin announced that the sides had allegedly agreed to present their vision for the solution to the border tensions between the two nations and that they would “work together” on a solution.

Azerbaijani President, Ilham Aliyev utilized the prior CICA summit to lambast his Armenian counterpart. Armenia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ararat Mirzoyan, voiced the need to remove Azerbaijani troops from Armenian territory at a trilateral meeting on the same day. Putin, on the other hand, offered his Armenian and Azerbaijani counterparts to hold negotiations in Moscow at the CIS summit the following day. 

Moscow may have used the CICA and CIS summits to present Russia in a “different” but simultaneously “traditional” light for the CIS nations. Whether Putin’s efforts to be a mediator in conflicts between CIS nations bear fruit is a guessing game.

The head of Kyrgyzstan's security forces showing off Turkish drones and the stationing of the Pechora-2BM anti-aircraft missile system in Batken will make things worse between Dushanbe and Bishkek. Tajikistan has also purportedly applied to purchase Iranian drones. Even if Baku and Yerevan settle their disputes, this does not rule out future clashes between the two nations. Indeed, Azerbaijan may utilize Baku’s newly-found international standing in gas and transit routes to have Yerevan’s interests placed on the back burner.  

Russia and Central Asia, or Central Asia and Russia?

Russia used this platform to call for the meeting’s participants to join in on their efforts of import substitution. He also expressed interest in reviving Central Asia’s unified energy system. Both are obvious attempts of Russia tossing their bait for potential catches in Moscow’s efforts to alleviate the impact of sanctions.

Kyrgyz president Sadyr Japarov spoke about the potential benefit of using Kyrgyzstan’s vast water resources. He also expressed Bishkek’s continued interest in working with Russia and other Central Asian nations. Japarov also emphasized the importance to include Afghanistan in international dialogues. Toqayev pointed out the need to drop trade barriers between the nations. The whole conference felt like a scene from groundhog day.

 The Tajik President’s blindsiding of Putin brought onlookers back into reality. The Tajik president, Rahmon Emomali, “requested” not to treat the countries of Central Asia as the former USSR and asked to be treated with mutual respect. A similar statement would have been unthinkable prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. 

Rahmon, however, could have also just seized the opportunity to openly demand more Russian involvement in Tajikistan. Temur Umarov, a Carnegie Politika fellow, pointed out that Tajikistan is in the perfect position for forcing Moscow into concessions. He also highlighted the fact that Russia might have already been doing favours for Dushanbe prior to this outburst. Moscow labelled a Tajik opposition party a “terrorist organization”. Russia also deported Pamiri activists after Tajik authorities cracked down on the unrest in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast of Tajikistan.

No Man Is An Island

Both the CICA, CIS, and Russia and Central Asia meetings presented opportunities for all the participants involved. Some sought to highlight their achievements, others chose to use it as a personal soap box. 

However, whether or not these organizations can bring anything to fruition is hinged on their proper functioning. The past summits did not really encourage this notion, as it seemed like everyone had their own ideas regarding what should take centre stage. 

Regardless, Astana seems to have scored a strategic foreign policy victory from the whole situation considering all the praise they received. Only time will tell if Kazakhstan can capitalize on it and whether or not CICA can become more functional.