Week In Review: Diplomatic Efforts, Logistics, And More...

Orda.kz has put together a brief synopsis of last week's news.

Kyrgyzstan Finding Its Voice?

Kyrgyzstan's security services detained four in Osh on alleged charges related to recruiting individuals to fight for Russia in Ukraine.

Among the detained were a staff member of the Osh mayor's press service, a Russian House employee, and a Russian political consultant. According to Kloop, the consultant, Victor Vasiliev, has ties to a Wagner-affiliated Telegram channel, "Smile and Wave."

Following the detentions, Russian State Duma deputy Mikhail Matveev chimed in.

Matveev, known for his controversial claims regarding Central Asia, boasted that Russia has many tools to exert pressure, including blocking transfers from Russian banks to Kyrgyzstan:

I think it would be easy to take and restrict transfers to Kyrgyzstan, for example, of funds from Russian banks. Could something like this happen to these transfers, when they suddenly end up blocked? A great power has a million options for how to put a small, impudent organization that behaves insolently in its place,  the deputy said.

Kyrgyz MP Dastan Bekeshev did not leave the above statement unanswered, demanding a law that bans "undesirable individuals" and their relatives from entering or engaging in any activities in the country. 

Ultimately, Kyrgyzstan's security chief, Kamchybek Tashiev, and Russian Ambassador Sergey Vakunov held discussions, and the suspects were moved from detention to house arrest pending further investigation.

Not long before, another spat flared up over a police raid at the "Bodrost" bathhouse in Moscow on April 10, during which dozens of Kyrgyz nationals were detained. 

The Kyrgyz Foreign Ministry issued a formal diplomatic protest, demanding explanations and accountability. The Russian Foreign Ministry claimed the operation was a general security measure, citing alleged immigration violations and ties to radical groups among some of the detainees.

Russian authorities have launched an investigation into the April 10 incident, but only violations committed by the detainees have been made public. 

In the past few months, Kyrgyzstan's authorities have indeed been openly vocal toward Russia, and the arrest of the alleged recruiters speaks volumes.

Bishkek could be drawing lines in the sand to demonstrate the limitations of its loyalty:

The participation of official Russian structures in recruiting Kyrgyz citizens for war goes beyond the agreements between the leaderships of Russia and Kyrgyzstan, and thus Bishkek is drawing the boundaries of its loyalty. How the case goes further, what terms the accused will receive and what Moscow's participation will be in this will make it clear to what extent this is a random episode or a signal from Bishkek to Moscow,  writes Temur Umarov, a fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center.

Russia may not be in the uncertain position it was after the onset of its invasion of Ukraine, but the lack of substantial progress in talks on ending the war still forces it not to undervalue allies, no matter how "little" they are.

Meetings Across Central Asia

Kazakhstan's President Qasym-Jomart Toqayev hosted Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow, Chair of Turkmenistan’s People's Council, in Turkistan last week. Their talks emphasized cooperation on major gas, transportation, and digitalization projects, including Kazakhstan’s potential participation in developing the Galkynysh gas field. 

Notably, the North-South Corridor, a strategic transport route linking Russia, Central Asia, and South Asia, was discussed during the talks, highlighting Astana's ongoing efforts to establish itself as a logistics hub. Both  Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are vital links in another prominent corridor — The Middle Corridor.

Issues with both corridors, however, persist: the Middle Corridor still faces capacity constraints, and the North-South Corridor, subject to similar problems and different customs regulatory frameworks, lacks a key link.

Reports indicate that the missing link, i.e., the Rasht–Astara railway, may be completed by 2028-2029.

Kazakhstan, Russia, and Uzbekistan signed separate documents to move forward with logistics via Afghanistan.

Uzbekistan and Russia formally agreed to begin developing the long-anticipated Trans-Afghan railway, a major infrastructure project designed to link Central Asia with Pakistan via Afghanistan. Moscow had recently lifted the Taliban's terrorist status for such cooperation.

Meanwhile, Kazakhstan formalized its intentions to begin construction on the Turgundi–Herat–Kandahar–Spin Boldak railway line and secured commercial agreements with Kabul.

Before this, Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev welcomed both Lavrov and Berdimuhamedow in Samarqand.

Although Afghanistan is not directly linked to the North-South Corridor, logistics running through it could indirectly amplify its reach. Despite Afghan authorities' reassurances, security and safety remain hurdles, a statement that extends to the North-South Corridor as well.

Incidentally, the intelligence chiefs of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan met for the first time in Tashkent. Kazakhstan's President also held talks with General Asim Munir, the Chief of Army Staff of the Pakistan Armed Forces, on April 23. Tajikistan's President Emomali Rahmon had held a similar meeting at the end of last December. 

Islamabad has a fragile relationship with Kabul, yet it continues to maintain interactions.

These events may not be directly intertwined, yet Central Asian nations appear to be engaging with one another and others to facilitate a cautious reintegration of Kabul. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have long been proponents of direct engagement with Afghanistan.

They could emerge as key players in this regard, particularly Tashkent, through the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, which would attract additional cargo flow to the Trans-Afghan railway upon their completion.

Still, the unpredictability stemming from the security situation in Afghanistan could overshadow any effort. The Qosh-Tepa Canal, under construction in northern Afghanistan, is expected to consume large amounts of water from the Amu-Darya, an outcome that could strain Kabul's relations with Central Asia, particularly with Ashgabat and Tashkent. 

Such developments could prompt both nations, along with other regional actors, to prioritize other logistical interests while continuing interactions with Kabul within their current capacity. At the same time, sanctions risks associated with Russia's and Iran's involvement in the North-South Corridor are a factor that cannot be overlooked.

China, for its part, may also seek the North-South corridor and the Trans-Afghan railway as complementary extensions of its long-standing strategic initiative, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). However, India views the North-South Corridor as a hedge against China's China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and New Delhi's strained relations with Pakistan may also have a negative impact.

Still, Beijing is likely to be keen on seeing output boosted elsewhere, especially in the context of Trump's trade war, Panama's withdrawal from the BRI, and the potential for the Trans-Afghan railway to enhance cargo flow via CPEC. And, although China is not a participant in the North-South Corridor, increased connectivity across Eurasia could provide secondary benefits to Chinese trade by offering more diversified access points to Europe and the Middle East.

Moreover, Moscow and Tehran, heavily dependent on Beijing and key stakeholders in the corridor, are unlikely to allow it to impede China's strategic interests.

Central Asia, meanwhile, is unlikely to limit itself and continue pragmatic pushes for diversity rather than being overreliant on one particular option.