Week In Review: Back in Business

Orda has put together a brief synopsis of news from the past two weeks after a brief hiatus.
Kyrgyzstan: Social Democrats Continue Facing Pressure, Presidential Office Dismisses Media Investigation
The situation surrounding Kyrgyzstan's Social Democrats party leaders has continued to escalate.
Sultanbekov, arrested alongside party members Irina Karamushkina and Roza Turksever in November 2024 on voter bribery charges, collapsed during questioning at the Bishkek Police Department a week before last.
Sultanbekov had entered his 75th day of hunger strike in detention.
Authorities maintained that his condition was "satisfactory" at Detention Center-1.
A Bishkek City Court later rejected appeals to modify detention measures for all three party leaders. During the hearing, Sultanbekov, reportedly unable to walk independently, denounced the proceedings as "complete lawlessness."
A week prior, police conducted a vehicle search on January 22, sparking controversy.
The "search" targeted a car and led to the arrest of party member Ermek Ermatov, who allegedly attempted to destroy electronic evidence.
Police claimed to have discovered compromising documents, including passports belonging to party leadership.
Ermatov was detained for three days on hooliganism charges, subsequently claiming he was assaulted during the arrest. Law enforcement followed with a claim of employing sambo, a Russian martial art and combat sport.
Following these events, authorities summoned Kadyrbek Atambaev and his mother, Raisa Atambaeva, for additional questioning.
They had previously been interrogated on January 22 regarding the above bribery allegations.
They signed non-disclosure agreements afterward. Atambaev contests the official narrative, asserting that the seized materials contained evidence compromising the investigation rather than the alleged bribery.
Meanwhile, Kanybek Tumanbaev, Head of the Presidential Administration, dismissed a joint investigation by Kloop and Temirov Live regarding President Sadyr Japarov's house as "groundless."
He labeled it "attempts to spread lies under the guise of journalism."
The investigation concerned Japarov's family house in Bishkek, which he publicly transferred to the State Mortgage Company (SMC) in 2021, with proceeds to purchase 10 apartments for low-income families.
The investigation revealed that Japarov's house was sold to people from his inner circle; the current owner is the son of Arzybek Burkanov, the President's former advisor and friend. The same individual is reportedly receiving ownership of large companies seized during the "kuturization" campaign.
Tumanbaev furnished documentation showing the 2022 auction sale with only two participants, failing to address to whom the house ultimately returned.
He reasserted that the proceeds were directed toward public housing construction.
Russia and Syria Dynamics
January 22 marked two events that caught people's attention regarding Russia and Syria: the new Syrian authorities kiboshed its agreement with Russian company Stroytransgaz for Tartus port management, and the Russian vessel Sparta II docked at the same port.
The former event may not be as groundbreaking as initially perceived.
Expert Charles Lister, a senior fellow and the Director of The Syria and Countering Terrorism & Extremism programs at the Middle East Institute, pointed out that the voiding extends only to Stroytransgaz's contract to manage commercial activities at the port.
At the same time, Russia's 49-year lease contract with Syria remains in place. Stroytransgaz had also shut down its operations in mid-2024 before Bashar al-Assad was toppled.

Regardless, subsequent reports allude to Moscow not leaving its military equipment in the area up to fate.
At the same time, Damascus has put forward demands, including handing Assad over, while Moscow has only acknowledged ongoing talks.
Going forward, Syria’s leadership must maintain a proper balance with the West, as unnecessary cooperation with a global pariah such as Russia would not foster the removal of restrictions burdening the Syrian economy.
Investments, reconstruction, and state-building will supersede anything else, whereas Russia's capacity to provide meaningful financial support is questionable.
Expert opinion indeed points to Syria seeking multiple counterbalances, and the new leadership seems to have the upper hand with Russia.
The Kremlin's option of maintaining its military footprint in Libya could divert Russian authorities elsewhere, though.
U.S.-Russia-Ukraine: Trump’s Position Remains Ambiguous
Russia reacted to Trump's threats of "new sanctions" to be implemented, provided Moscow fails to end its war against Ukraine at the negotiation table.
However, skepticism remains about whether the new US President's administration will follow through. His Ukraine envoy has floated the condition of holding Presidential elections upon a ceasefire.
Although this situation is not identical to Moscow's claims that Zelenskyy is an illegitimate leader, the White House seems to be playing to Russia's narratives to some extent. Further uncertainty follows with Trump's tariff threats against the EU and those implemented against Canada and Mexico.
In parallel, Putin played to his American counterpart's ego by saying Trump would "restore order in Europe," perhaps a calculated move to exploit emerging gaps in Western unity.

While Trump's executive order aid has halted finances Ukraine needs, Russia's issues on the battlefield persist along with oil transport being seemingly squeezed.
The Insider released a report suggesting Russia might face equipment shortages, drastically slowing down future combat operations. The report also mentions Ukraine, which faces a similar issue compounded by political restraints that could prevent allies from keeping supplies consistently flowing.
Still, this does not translate as an end to the war, and little is known about how the Trump administration will handle negotiations with Russia.
Moscow's ability to produce equipment outpaces Ukraine's as well.
Other News
Belarus held presidential elections last Sunday, and to no one's surprise, Alexander Lukashenko secured his seventh presidential term. Although Lukashenko could have been trying to come off as forgiving before elections with pardons, he has unlikely done so for key opposition and faced condemnation for the elections.

Regional actors were probably prepared for Lukashenko's victory, but tensions remain elsewhere.
Amid tensions over gas transit, Ukraine's military intelligence HUR denied Slovak PM Fico's claims. Fico alleged that the Georgian Legion, fighting on behalf of Ukraine against Russian forces, was behind alleged coup attempts and protests in Slovakia.
Fico failed to provide any substantial evidence.
Ukraine's intelligence head also made headlines. A leak revealed that Kyrylo Budanov purportedly warned of serious consequences for Ukraine’s existence if negotiations did not begin by the summer, prompting a probe into individuals who had access to the classified session in parliament.
Central Asia: Ankara Declaration, EU-Kazakhstan Talks, and Uzbekistan’s Cautious EAEU Approach
EU Special Envoy for Sanctions David O'Sullivan visited Kazakhstan, reiterating the bloc's position of not bringing Kazakhstan into its sanctions against Russia. O'Sullivan later announced he had requested Kazakhstan's authorities to pay mind to codes of goods in the EU's 16th sanction package.
At the same time, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Türkiye signed the Ankara Declaration.
It aims to strengthen regional cooperation through transport infrastructure development, mutual sovereignty protection, and economic partnerships, most notably The Middle Corridor, a route bypassing Russia.
Still, Uzbekistan's Prime Minister drummed a familiar tune in Almaty.
Prime Minister Abdulla Aripov announced Uzbekistan is considering joining the Eurasian Economic Union's (EAEU) unified customs transit system. He also proposed streamlined cargo transport, trade barrier removal, industrial cooperation, digital initiatives, and agricultural development.
Tashkent has long been wary of becoming a full-fledged EAEU member but will continue to seek benefits from interactions with member states. Russia and Uzbekistan also inked a 2025 military cooperation plan and a longer-term strategic military partnership program covering 2026-2030.
Additionally, while Uzbekistan is not directly involved, Tashkent has demonstrated interest in the "North-South Corridor," a project developed by Azerbaijan, India, Iran, and Russia, alluding to it cautiously exploring the matter.
Kazakhstan, meanwhile, has balanced its engagement with the EU and Russia and is keen to maintain ties with both, as evidenced by ongoing communication with the EU Special Envoy and Russian energy and logistic cooperation.
Latest news
- Kazakhstan Continues Selling Gold Reserves
- Uzbekistan, Russia to Streamline Labor Migration Process
- Army Chief Urges Public to "Trust Official Statements" Amid Military Incidents
- Almaty Hostel Fire Trial Reopens to Press Coverage
- Direct Flights from Almaty to New York and Tokyo Expected in 2025
- Political Scientist Comments on Kulibayev's Reported Deal
- Crocus Terror Attack Investigation Completed
- Toqayev Meets Business Leaders Amid VAT Rate Discussions
- Import Reliance and Rising Prices: What’s Happening in Kazakhstan’s Pharmaceutical Market?
- Uzbekistan and Switzerland Agree on Return of $182 Million in Karimova Assets
- VAT Rate Increase: Atameken Chamber Holds Meeting
- Kazakhstan Leads EAEU in Price Growth but Trails in Some Areas
- Trump Suspends USAID Operations: How Does This Affect Kazakhstan?
- Slovakia Resumes Russian Gas Imports Via TurkStream
- Agricultural Cooperative Head Misuses Dairy Subsidies for Luxury Vehicle Purchase
- Prosecutors Recover 20,000 Hectares of Forest Fund from Private Businesses
- Billions Lost in Digital Development Programs, Audit Reveals
- Yerlan Zhagiparov: Court Issues Verdict in Qantar Case
- Aqsu District Court Chair Under Investigation for Corruption
- Trump Signs Order Sanctioning International Criminal Court