Week In Review: Minerals, Contracts, And More...

Orda.kz has put together a brief synopsis of last week's news.

A Change In Tone?

On April 25, 2025, European countries and Ukraine delivered their official response to former U.S. President Donald Trump’s proposed peace plan. 

The European proposal is structured into four sections: ceasefire conditions, security guarantees, territorial issues, and economic matters. The plan calls for an “unconditional” ceasefire, U.S.-monitored peace talks, the return of civilians and children from occupied areas, an “all-for-all” prisoner swap, and Ukraine’s right to EU membership. Sanctions relief on Russia would depend on the durability of peace.

Three days later,  Russian President Vladimir Putin announced a temporary ceasefire from May 7 to May 11 to mark the 80th anniversary of Victory Day. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has slammed the move as “manipulation” and called for an immediate, 30-day ceasefire instead. This has been Putin's second "attempt" to have guns fall silent; violations marred the first.

More notably, Ukraine and the U.S. inked the long-awaited rare earth metals agreement to fund Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction. Ukraine’s long-game strategy paid off; U.S. hawkish demands were dropped. Kyiv safeguarded national interests, avoiding heavy-handed U.S. control over resources, creating debt obligations, and maintaining full Ukrainian ownership over subsoil assets. 

The deal’s future remains uncertain given the global rare earth competition, outdated Soviet-era resource data, logistical hurdles, and the absence of a peace settlement.

Additionally, most of the more promising areas remain under Russian occupation.

Nonetheless, the White House subsequently approved a $50 million weapons sale to Ukraine through the Defense Commercial Sales program. The reported approval comes after earlier temporary freezes on arms transfers.

The Trump administration continues to manage the public optics of the conflict.

Keith Kellogg, Trump’s special envoy, stated on Fox News that Ukraine is prepared to make “factual concessions,” allowing Russia de facto control over occupied territories without formal recognition. Kellogg added that Ukraine has reviewed the U.S. 22-point peace plan and is willing to accept it, leaving the next move to Moscow.

Soon after, the U.S. declared it would no longer serve as a mediator in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, leaving negotiations to Moscow and Kyiv. Secretary of State Marco Rubio confirmed that the final decisions rest with President Trump. And, Vice President J.D. Vance expressed cautious optimism that both sides will move toward ending the war.

Against that backdrop, Trump's posture has made a notable shift. 

Trump announced that May 8 would officially be recognized as Victory Day in World War II across the United States. Trump made the declaration on Truth Social, highlighting the U.S.'s significant role in defeating Nazi Germany. It could have been perceived as provocative; Russia has long prided itself on being the driving force in toppling Nazi Germany.

In parallel, intensifying sanctions are reportedly at the ready, though the U.S. President has to make the final call. Their effectiveness vis-à-vis deterrence remains questionable; Moscow appears undeterred, while the efficacy is hinged on their enforcement and coordination with other nations. But, a notable economic impact has occurred with Russia's economy slowing down.

Before that, the Trump administration had dismantled a U.S. Justice Department task force targeting Russian oligarchs, while the U.S. President says the above scenario depends on whether Russia is 'behaving' on the peace deal.

Meanwhile, India, despite sweeping sanctions following former U.S. President Joe Biden's departure, has ramped up Russian oil imports. China set records for such imports in 2024, but state-owned companies have reduced them. Yet, privately-managed Chinese ports reportedly accepted sanctioned tankers carrying Russian oil in late April.

Washington may not be concerned with what would occur to China's economy. However, the impact on New Delhi, a regional rival of Beijing, could cause reluctance; the White House needs allies amid its openly anti-Chinese narratives and ongoing tariffs. Exceptions may be made, much like those for Türkiye and Gazprom.

The Trump administration seems to be looking for a way to divert responsibility while trying to sell any progress as a victory. They will likely seek other foreign policy wins, such as their talks with Iran, though how successful they will be is still forthcoming.

Dropping oil prices, amplified by Saudi Arabia's intentions to ramp up production, might impact Russian budget revenues. Still, Russian officials' reiteration of territorial demands and financial instruments, e.g., currency devaluation, suggests the war's end is anywhere but near, explaining Kyiv's push to restore a steady arms flow. 

Incidentally, EU Commissioner Andrius Kubilius said the EU will double military aid to Ukraine if Russia rejects peace, says EU Commissioner Andrius Kubilius. By buying cheaper Ukrainian-made weapons, the EU can double the impact of its €40 billion budget.

EU countries may also use loans to boost aid — a strategy Kubilius calls “peace through strength.” The bloc has previously been reluctant in this regard, and disagreements led to rebranding the "ReArm Europe" initiative and previous obstacles in military aid for Ukraine, which needs more than declarations.

A Different Angle

On May 1, the Ukrainian project "I Want to Live" released a list, this time naming 1,110 Uzbek citizens under contract with the Russian military.

At least 109 of those are reported killed, the youngest under 21, the oldest 62. The project noted that many Uzbeks were recruited under pressure, and Tashkent was urged to take steps to halt the practice.

Tashkent did not respond immediately, but a local media outlet, which operates carefully within the media's controlled boundaries, wrote about the list. Days later, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed ‘concern’ in a meeting with the Russian ambassador Oleg Malginov.

The concern was tied to the rising number of violations of the rights of migrant workers and their treatment in Russia:

Such cases are considered a violation of the rights and freedoms of Uzbek citizens working in Russia, and these rights and freedoms must be ensured in accordance with the legislation of the host country,  the department's statement says, without specifying what incidents were discussed.

The Minister requested that the issues raised be reviewed and Uzbekistan’s concerns be conveyed to the relevant authorities.

Meanwhile, officials have reiterated the country’s legal ban on "mercenarism." Reports indicate relatively lenient sentences have been rendered, though. Verdicts have been handed down in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan as well.

The "I Want to Live" project also released a similar list of citizens from Kazakhstan, prompting a response from officials both domestically and diplomatically. One with citizens from Turkmenistan and Tajikistan has also emerged. 

All Central Asian nations have laws with heavy penalties against fighting in foreign conflicts.

Ashgabat has rarely commented on political matters and will likely maintain silence, whereas Dushanbe has issued warnings and protested similarly to Tashkent. There is no official number of how many natives from the Central Asian region are serving in Russia, and some have questioned the veracity of the lists.

At the same time, RFE/RL Radio Ozodi has claimed that Tajik law enforcement has been compiling its own list:

We talked to all the families. Some have dual citizenship. It's hard to open a case until a notice comes from Russia or the person shows up, an employee of the Khatlon Department of Internal Affairs told the media.

Incidentally, Kyrgyzstan's authorities recently detained individuals on charges of mercenary recruiting, later to be released under house arrest with pending court dates. A list of its citizens has also appeared. Although Kyrgyz authorities maintain the event is unrelated, the detentions followed a police raid in a Moscow bathhouse.

Against that backdrop, Russian historian and political commentator Andrei Grozin was denied entry to Kazakhstan, reportedly without explanation, on April 27. Grozin was scheduled to participate in events in Astana.

According to Deutsche Welle, Grozin is on a black list along with Tina Kandelaki, Tigran Keosanyan, Alexander Dugin, Nikita Mendkovich, State Duma deputies Yevgeny Fedorov, Vyacheslav Nikonov, and Pyotr Tolstoy.

Reportedly, his controversial statements were the reason.

Before the denial, Kazakhstan's Minister of Culture and Information announced that "a warning" would be sent to Sputnik's Kazakhstan branch.

This followed accusations made by journalist and human rights defender Lukpan Akhmedyarov that the outlet promotes war propaganda related to Ukraine. The Minister said legal experts would review the matter and that the Ministry would act within the law.

In contrast, Azerbaijan had shut down its local Sputnik office in late February amid a broader move to reduce foreign media's presence. More recently, an Azerbaijani lawmaker blamed the infamous APT29 group, also known as Cozy Bear, widely believed to be linked to Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service, for a February cyber attack. 

Baku and Moscow's relations have altered following the AZAL plane crash in Aqtau, Kazakhstan, yet they have not crossed the point of no return.

Although these nations will maintain strategic ties with Moscow, other activities may be viewed differently now.