Week In Review: Meetings, Logistics, And More...

Orda.kz has put together a brief synopsis of last week's news. This edition focuses on Armenia, Russia, and Azerbaijan.

A Meeting in Moscow

On November 5, security officials from across the Commonwealth of Independent States convened in Moscow to discuss stability and cooperation.

In particular, Azerbaijani Security Council Secretary Ramil Usubov met with his Russian counterpart Sergey Shoigu during the meeting. They discussed regional security cooperation and the resumption of the “3+3” regional platform.

Shoigu emphasized that the South Caucasus needs constant attention and consultations, noting that peace processes should remain regional. Armenian Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan echoed this and thanked Shoigu for the meeting.

Shoigu further stressed the need to unblock transport and communication routes in the region, a point tied to prior agreements in the trilateral working group.  

His remarks come amid notable progress in easing regional tensions, namely between Armenia and Azerbaijan. They can be seen as Russia attempting to reinsert itself as a key player in regional discussions.

However, Russia's role has diminished sharply and is unlikely to recover in the foreseeable future.

Moscow has nonetheless made progress in appeasing Baku, which has established itself as a pivotal regional actor.

Amid this progress, Azerbaijani media have claimed that the Kremlin shared Ramiz Mehdiyev's coup d'état plans, which he allegedly sought to execute with Russian support. Mehdiyev has been labeled a "gray cardinal" and held an influential position as Head of the Presidential Administration of Azerbaijan from 1994 to 2019.

According to The Insider, an anonymous source purportedly told Vetsi Baku that the AZAL plane crash — a catalyst in deteriorating Azerbaijani-Russian relations — was mistakenly shot down instead of Aliyev's aircraft en route to Moscow.

Although Aliyev was indeed traveling to Moscow at the time, the assertion is questionable. How Azerbaijani officials perceive it is unclear, but the narrative being pushed around Mehdiyev suggests he has become a convenient focus of speculation.

Similarly, Armenian law enforcement arrested the mayor of Gyumri, Vardan Ghukasyan. Ghukasyan stands accused of “public calls to renounce the sovereignty of the Republic of Armenia.”

The accusation stems from his statement that "Armenia should form a union with Russia, while preserving its own laws, parliament, and government." It follows others made over questionable ties to Russia, namely Samvel Karapetyan.

Pashinyan's party seems to be sidelining political opponents before the 2026 parliamentary elections, as his popularity appears unlikely to secure a victory. 

Although Baku and Yerevan continue to acknowledge Moscow formally, both demonstrate non-negligible agency in their decision-making and preference to prioritize their interests.  

Clashing Reports, Strong Language

Around the same time, reports surfaced about a major Armenian deal to acquire India’s Su-30MKI fighter jets.

Yerevan swiftly denied them, with Defense Minister Suren Papikyan stating that no such agreement exists. Still, India and Armenia have been developing a close defense partnership, as Yerevan remains wary of its traditional partner, Moscow, following its failure to deliver weapons already paid for.

Following President Ilham Aliyev’s remarks claiming there is no Lake Sevan — a well-known Armenian landmark — only Goycha, the Armenian Authorities were quick to respond, labeling the remarks as incomplete, politically motivated, and aimed at domestic audiences.

One explanation was that the Azerbaijani president was not threatening war, but was speaking of peaceful access. Meanwhile, Armenia's Defense Minister Suren Papikyan commented that since August 8, Azerbaijani rhetoric has softened, and added that peace is becoming a reality.

Against that backdrop, Baku marked its victory in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War on November 8, with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif present — a notable pairing, given Türkiye’s fraught history with Armenia and Pakistan’s own tensions with India.

Incidentally, on November 3, Armenian Parliament Speaker Alen Simonyan addressed the lack of a signed peace treaty and noted Azerbaijan’s absence from the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly and President Aliyev’s choice not to attend the European Political Community summit in Armenia in May 2026.

Indeed, a roundtable between representatives of Armenian and Azerbaijani civil society was held on October 21–22 in Yerevan at the Research Center for Policy Studies, marking the first such dialogue not in a third country.

Observers still caution how independent such actors are, underscoring the overall fragility.  

Economic Signals

In late October, Azerbaijan lifted all cargo transit restrictions to Armenia, in place since the 1990s Karabakh conflict. The announcement came from President Aliyev at a joint press conference with President Qasym-Jomart Toqayev in Astana.

At the time, Aliyev asserted that peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan was reflected in action, not just words.

Both Kazakh and Russian wheat subsequently reached Armenia via Azerbaijan.

Against that backdrop, Armenia announced that it had completed preparations for reopening its border with Türkiye. Secretary of the Security Council Armen Grigoryan, citing research from the Amberd Institute at the Crossroads of Peace conference in Brussels, said mutual benefits could include up to a 200% trade increase, with shorter trade routes to Eastern and Central Europe.

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced on October 27 during the 2026 draft budget discussion that Armenia is ready to serve as a transit route for Turkish-Azerbaijani cargo, proposing the Margara–Yeghegnadzor–Sisian–Goris corridor.

Official Ankara has so far demonstrated little interest in the proposal.

Despite apparent interest in reopening logistics, Türkiye seems unwilling to overstep prematurely, given the lack of a signed peace agreement and its long-standing commitment to Azerbaijan.

Ready, Set...No?

Regardless of readiness, Armenian officials have been consistent in their rejection of Baku's favored route, “the Zangezur Corridor,” instead promoting the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), agreed upon via the declaration signed in Washington.

Yerevan's alternative project, "The Crossroads of Peace," has remained central to Armenia's narrative, but no definitive date for construction has emerged. By comparison, official Baku has floated a potential 2028 start date for the Zangezur Corridor.

Although other issues remain between the two nations as well, such as constitutional claims, expert opinion is cautiously optimistic that the risk of military escalation has fallen greatly. Azerbaijan's lifting of cargo restrictions for Armenia is indeed encouraging, but a signed peace deal remains hostage to the same narratives it was before Trump brokered the Washington declaration.

Türkiye will back Baku, while appearing to prefer a consensus among all parties. In contrast, Russia will assume whatever role it receives, as minimal as it may be. Once pushing for the Zangezur Corridor, Moscow has, in all likelihood, lost the opportunity to become its security guarantor, and Russian authorities have come to terms.

Iran — an adamant defender of Armenian territorial sovereignty — will continue to oppose the corridor unless U.S. influence over the corridor is somehow limited, a stance China is also likely to find advantageous. Beijing has expanded its presence in the area.

The U.S. is not formally bound to TRIPP despite appearances. A timetable and key details are yet to be settled, including the extent to which US contractors will be involved in operating the corridor and providing security.

Additionally, the Trump Administration has shown it is quick to move on to other events, providing an opportunity for another party to influence the situation. Astana, guided by neutrality and pragmatism, could emerge as such an actor, as Kazakhstan maintains positive relations with all parties involved. Aliyev's announcement of lifting restrictions on Armenia in Astana underscores Kazakhstan's ability to function as such.

Whatever influence comes into play, Baku and Yerevan remain their own worst enemies, both metaphorically and literally. Armenian officials have rushed to quell reports that might suggest an arms build-up, while Baku, having the upper hand, trumpets its victory in Karabakh, one seen as a devastating defeat in Armenia.

Tones may have shifted, but the underlying logic remains unchanged. Whether sustainable engagement follows or lines in the sand are simply redrawn remains to be seen.