Bek Air Crash Trial in Almaty Reveals Disputes Over Pilot Blame and Expert Findings

The trial over the crash of a Bek Air aircraft is underway at the Turksib District Court of Almaty, Orda.kz reports.

The plane crash, which claimed the lives of 12 passengers, occurred on December 27, 2019. The investigation lasted several years and was completed only in 2024. In the following months, the parties reviewed the case materials.

An Unprepared Prosecutor

The court is examining the case materials related to the crash of the Fokker100 aircraft. In addition to the 12 passengers of the flight, the crash also claimed the lives of two pilots — Marat Muratbayev (on the spot) and Mirzhan Muldakulov (who died a month later).

They are listed as defendants in the criminal case over the crash because, according to investigators, they failed to properly conduct the de-icing procedure before the flight — specifically, they did not treat the aircraft’s wings.

The case is being presided over by Judge Dastan Almagambetov. Present at the trial are the state prosecutor, a representative of the Main Transport Prosecutor’s Office, and three lawyers representing the victims and the wives of the deceased pilots.

Journalists were able to attend only the fifth hearing. It became clear during the proceedings that the version blaming solely the deceased pilots is not supported by all participants in the process.

During the hearing, it also emerged that not all participants were properly prepared. The prosecutor from the Main Transport Prosecutor’s Office, Nurzhan Kairatuly, received a sharp rebuke from the judge.

Today is the fourth hearing, we work from morning till night, and this is your first statement. Why are you behaving so passively? You don’t know in which volume which materials are located. At the last hearing, we sat and searched for one disc for two hours. You come unprepared. I don’t understand one thing — the case is high-profile, multi-volume, and yet you come to the court hearing unprepared! Prosecutor, get involved, study the case materials.

The prosecutor promised that this would not happen again.

"Sluggish and Unqualified"

Nurzhan Kairatuly read out the findings of one of the expert reports, according to which the deceased pilots, despite suspecting icing on the aircraft’s wings, ordered de-icing only of the tail section.

The decision of the aircraft commander Muratbayev not to treat the wings in icing conditions was a mistake, which affected the entire subsequent course of events. The erroneous decision of the PIC Muratbayev was influenced by the subconscious pilot’s mindset towards saving money, instilled in him by Bek Air owner Zhumassultanov, flight director Saparov, and pilot-instructor Schmidt. The incorrect decision of the PIC not to treat the wings became a natural consequence of the airline’s internal policy, determined by the owners and managers of the airline, where commercial values were considered the main priorities, and by no means the rules of flight safety,
 said Nurzhan Kairatuly.

He also pointed to the insufficient qualifications of both pilots, which, he said, led to incorrect decisions during takeoff — namely, incorrect speeds and engine settings without accounting for icing, and the wrong flap angle.

According to the expert report, Muratbayev should have aborted the flight after the first unsuccessful takeoff attempt.

However, he did not do so, fearing problems that would arise from canceling the flight.

The inadequate decision to continue the flight was partly facilitated by the pilot’s motivation to complete flights at all costs and avoid trouble at work since at Bek Air the priority was the airline’s commercial success, not flight safety. But the main reason for the erroneous decision to attempt another liftoff was that the aircraft captain did not recognize the icing factor, which would have inevitably forced him to refuse to continue the flight,
Kairatuly said.

Another factor in the pilot’s mistakes, the prosecutor noted, was Marat Muratbayev’s physical condition, described as “sluggish.”

The most likely reason for the reduced mental performance can be considered a condition that usually develops as a result of taking medications that have a depressing effect on the nervous system, including the central nervous system and brain. It is possible this was due to medications that Muratbayev took with him on the flight to prevent spikes in blood pressure, as he had a diagnosis of borderline blood pressure.

According to Kairatuly, the captain took these medications as prescribed by the aviation doctor, which was recorded in his medical file before the flight.

The drugs ‘Anaprilin’ and ‘Ketanol’ the PIC took occasionally for self-treatment purposes. All these medications have side effects on the central nervous system and can enhance each other’s effects, manifesting in mental weakness, dizziness, and headaches. Likely, under the influence of these medications, the PIC (pilot-in-command - Ed.) experienced reduced mental performance, which led to a superficial, shortened analysis of the abnormal situation and the ill-considered decision to continue the field flight in icing conditions.

Doubts About The Experts

Later, prosecutors again stumbled — the defense pointed out inconsistencies in the experts’ work: in one document, it stated that they were provided with samples of one de-icing fluid, while in the final report, it said the aircraft was treated with another.

Lawyers emphasized the fundamental difference between these data. The state prosecutor, Seitov, could not clearly explain the discrepancy.

This was only part of the inconsistencies that prompted the defense to file a motion to summon the experts for questioning.

I ask the court to grant the motion to summon all the experts for questioning. We need to clarify their special hands-on training for one simple reason: the entire text of the expert conclusions was taken  from the prosecution. Therefore, they must provide the court with reliable evidence that their conclusions are correct and correspond to reality,
 said lawyer Sergey Derzhavets.

He also called it an oversight that the experts did not examine the factor of wake turbulence from the previous aircraft, which had taken off one minute and 46 seconds earlier.

Because according to ICAO rules, the time interval should be three minutes, and we had one minute 46 seconds. And here every second matters because the airflow with vortexes from the departing aircraft will inevitably affect the next aircraft. Did the expert take that into account? 100% did not. This speaks to the lack of experience of the specialist who was engaged as an expert,
Derzhavets added.

A Pilot's Testimony 

The court also read out the interrogation protocol of pilot Mirzhan Muldakulov, who gave testimony about the circumstances of the crash before his death.

According to Muldakulov’s testimony, preparations for the ill-fated flight began as usual. The crew arrived at the airport on time and began inspecting the aircraft.

The crew arrived for the flight on time. Preparation of the aircraft began in advance. The condition of the wing was checked visually and by hand. The surface was dry and clean,
Muldakulov said.

Special attention was paid to the stabilizer — a critical component responsible for longitudinal stability. After discussing with the aircraft commander, it was decided to treat this part with de-icing fluid.

We discussed the stabilizer with the aircraft commander, and decided to treat the stabilizer with type-one fluid. For this, we called the shift engineer and instructed him to treat the tail section of the aircraft.

After the external inspection, the crew moved to prepare the cockpit. The PIC determined who would fly the aircraft.

After inspecting the aircraft, we entered the cockpit, checked everything as required, and began preparing for departure. The PIC said that he would fly, he would pilot himself,
 the testimony reads.

All pre-flight checks of the control systems revealed no issues.

Upon receiving taxi clearance, the crew encountered a brief delay in the takeoff queue. Ahead of them was an Air Astana plane that was scheduled to depart later.

Then the crew requested takeoff clearance. They were given the active runway, but it waited for a long time. After the Airbus took off, they cleared us for takeoff in two to three minutes. After passing the decision speed and raising the landing gear, it jolted into the sky. The PIC asked what was going on. The aircraft responded slowly to the crew’s actions.

The situation quickly worsened. The plane stopped responding normally to the pilots’ commands, which the crew immediately felt.

The aircraft lurched to the left, which prevented the co-pilot from reaching the lever to retract the landing gear. The aircraft lifted off the runway, and the PIC said: that’s it, we’re off, we’re off.

When asked by investigators what was meant by “the stabilizer is slow,” Muldakulov explained that it meant that the controls were sluggish, responding slowly."

The aircraft’s behavior became increasingly unpredictable.

It felt like the stabilizer was living its own life. My assumption is that the PIC reduced the engine setting to 35% to reduce nose-up, then increased it so as not to stall and not drop it.

The second takeoff attempt initially seemed promising.

The aircraft began to lift off from the ground, everything seemed fine. I internally relaxed, even lowered the control column. But then it dipped its nose again. It kept pulling the nose down. We were barely holding it together between the two of us, and we hit the ground. I saw that the PIC’s hands were on the column, he was pulling the nose up. The sluggish response of the brakes and stabilizer remained. The PIC was no longer in the mood for words. To avoid hitting nose-first into the ground, we had to drop it on the belly. We managed to bring it down gradually. Then there was uncontrolled movement on the ground.

During questioning, investigators asked why they didn’t attempt to abort takeoff. Muldakulov referred to aviation regulations.

No, we had already passed the decision speed. After passing the decision speed, we are required to continue takeoff. Everything was according to procedures. That’s why we didn’t try to abort.

Regarding the quality of the pre-flight inspection, the pilot was adamant.

How could we not have checked? We checked by hand in three places. I’m taller than the PIC and I checked the front part, ran my hand over the metal, it was clean and dry.

Muldakulov also mentioned weather conditions that could have played a role.

There was a big headwind ahead, 140 m/s. Although they said there was no wind. Us, a 40-ton plane, was blown over there like a chip.

The next hearing is scheduled for Thursday, August 7.

Bek Air, once known for the cheapest passenger flights in Kazakhstan, may now be forgotten by many. Soon it will be five years since the country’s last major passenger aircraft crash.

Original Author: Zhadra Zhulmukhametova